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Pluralism and Convergence: Judicial Standardization in Canadian Corporate Law 
Abstract 
This article uses statistical analysis of judicial decisions to address whether (and to what extent) the 
common law of corporations varies among the provinces. The primary findings are: (1) as measured by 
the number of case citations, provincial courts of appeal favour precedent from their home provinces; (2) 
the Supreme Court of Canada exerts a powerful standardizing influence across the provinces; and (3) on 
balance (and despite the “home province” bias of provincial courts of appeal), Canadian corporate law is 
largely homogeneous, with little variation among provincial jurisdictions. This article concludes that—for a 
variety of reasons—it is unlikely that any province will develop a distinctive body of corporate law. 
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DOES THE COMMON LAW of corporations vary among the provinces? Te answer 
is less evident than it might seem. Under the Canadian constitutional system, the 
provinces, territories, and the federal government share co-extensive powers to 
incorporate private businesses.1 Moreover, any Canadian corporation, regardless 
of jurisdictional origin, may freely conduct business anywhere across Canada.2  
Finally, entrepreneurs may choose the law of any Canadian province3 when 
incorporating a business,4 even without a physical presence in the incorporating 
jurisdiction.5 Tis set of “choice-of-law” rules creates the theoretical possibility 
1. As frst held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, see Citizens Insurance 
Company of Canada v Parsons [1881] UKPC 49 [Citizens]. Provincial legislatures are 
given the exclusive power to make laws in relation to “Te Incorporation of Companies 
with Provincial Objects.” See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92.11, 
reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. Citizens ruled that the federal Parliament can also 
make laws in relation to the incorporation of companies, despite the absence of any express 
constitutional authorization. 
2. Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Limited v R, [1916] 1 AC 566. 
3. Territorial corporations have the same freedom. For simplicity of language, the terms 
“province” and “provincial” are used to encompass both provinces and territories for the 
remainder of this article. 
4. As discussed herein, incorporators may also choose the federal Canada Business Corporations 
Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA]. 
5. In other words, Canadian corporate law is characterized by “jurisdictional mobility.” See 
Ronald J Daniels, “Should Provinces Compete? Te Case for a Competitive Corporate Law 
Market” (1991) 36 McGill LJ 130 at 156-59. See also Poonam Puri et al, Cases, Materials 
and Notes on Partnerships and Canadian Business Corporations, 6th ed (Tomson Reuters, 
2016) at 68-69, 168-71. 
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of a “market” for corporate law, in which incorporators select jurisdictions with 
favourable legal regimes and avoid jurisdictions with antiquated or inefcient 
legal rules.6 In the United States, a similar federal system led to active competition 
among the states, with Delaware emerging as the leading corporate jurisdiction.7 
However, despite institutional similarities between Canada and the United 
States, Canada has never experienced signifcant jurisdictional competition.8 
Te question of whether provincial competition in Canada is even possible was 
the subject of an academic exchange between Ronald Daniels (on one side of 
the debate) and Douglas Cumming and Jefrey MacIntosh (on the other) that 
began with Daniels’ pioneering article on provincial competition nearly thirty 
years ago.9 According to Daniels, not only is competition among the provinces 
possible, it can be used to explain the progressive adoption in the 1970s and 
1980s of provincial corporations legislation modelled after the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act (CBCA).10 Conversely, Cumming and MacIntosh are far more 
skeptical regarding the scope of jurisdictional competition—in their view, the 
proliferation of the CBCA was not the result of competition, but instead refected 
a culture of uniformity on the part of provincial lawmakers.11 
Although Daniels and Cumming and MacIntosh ultimately disagree as to the 
viability of provincial competition, they each identify signifcant obstacles to an 
interprovincial “market” in corporate law. According to both accounts, difculties 
faced by the provinces in developing their own jurisprudence have impeded 
6. For an overview of this theory in the United States context, see Roberta Romano, “Law as a 
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle” (1985) 1 JL Econ & Org 225 at 227-32 
[Romano, “Law as a Product”]. 
7. Ibid. See also Roberta Romano, Te Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI Press, 1993) 
[Romano, American Corporate Law]. For an analysis of the historical origins of state law 
competition, see Camden Hutchison, “Corporate Law Federalism in Historical Context: 
Comparing Canada and the United States” (2018) 64 McGill LJ 109 [Hutchison, 
“Corporate Law Federalism”]. Today, state competition in the U.S. has signifcantly 
decreased. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, “Te Myth of State Competition in Corporate 
Law” (2002) 55 Stan L Rev 679. 
8. Hutchison, “Corporate Law Federalism”, supra note 7. 
9. Supra note 5; Jef MacIntosh, “Te Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping 
Canadian Corporate Law: A Second Look” (1993) University of Toronto Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series 18; Douglas J Cumming & Jefrey G MacIntosh, “Te 
Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law” (2000) 20 Intl 
Rev L & Econ 141. 
10. Supra note 5. 
11. Cumming and MacIntosh ascribe this “impulse to achieving uniformity of provincial 
law” to the absence of a “competitive consciousness” among Canadian lawmakers. Supra
note 9 at 150-51. 
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
 
  
   
  
 














legislative competition.12 Since all provincial court13 decisions can be appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Canada—which exercises binding authority over all 
Canadian courts—no province can credibly assert jurisprudential independence.14 
Tis lack of independence contrasts with the federally divided judicial system 
of the United States, in which the Supreme Court almost never addresses state 
corporate law.15 In the United States, state courts (such as the Delaware judiciary) 
can fashion their own internal jurisprudence with an independence unavailable 
to Canadian provincial courts.16 In contrast to the “laboratories of democracy”17 
celebrated in the United States, “the Supreme Court of Canada does not tolerate 
divergences in the common law from province to province.”18 
Is it entirely true, however, that provinces are incapable of developing their 
own case law? Not according to Daniels, who argues that the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s infrequent acceptance of corporate law appeals mitigates its standardizing 
infuence on provincial jurisprudence.19 My own research conducted for this article 
confrms Daniels’ claim that it is increasingly rare for the Court to hear corporate 
law appeals. In the 1930s, the Court heard an average of 1.8 corporate cases per 
year. By the 2000s, that fgure had declined to 0.6.20 In addition to inattention 
by the Court, there are other reasons provincial law may not be uniform across 
Canada. First, certain provinces’ corporations acts difer from the CBCA.21 
Despite its fnal appellate authority, the Court’s interpretation of the CBCA—
12. Ibid at 154-58; Daniels, supra note 5 at 186-88. 
13. For simplicity of language, the generic term “provincial courts” (not to be confused with 
inferior Provincial Courts) will be used to describe provincial superior and appellate courts 
for the remainder of this article. 
14. Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 9 at 154-58; Daniels, supra note 5 at 186-88. Daniels 
as well as Cumming and MacIntosh difer primarily in their views on the seriousness of this 
obstacle. See also Romano, American Corporate Law, supra note 7 at 118-28. 
15. Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 9 at 154-58; Daniels, supra note 5 at 187, n 130. 
16. Tis lack of independence has both formal and informal aspects. According to MacIntosh, 
Holmes, and Tompson, “a high degree of informal comity exists amongst the provinces 
in the corporate law arena,” due in part to the appellate authority of the Supreme Court. 
See Jefrey G MacIntosh, Janet Holmes & Steve Tompson, “Te Puzzle of Shareholder 
Fiduciary Duties” (1991) 19 Can Bus LJ 86 at 96. 
17. “Laboratories of democracy” is the phrase popularized by Justice Louis Brandies. See 
New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1932) (to describe policy experimentation 
among the states). 
18. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Carswell, 2007), ch 8 at 12. 
19. Supra note 5 at 187. 
20. Tese statistics are derived from the case data discussed in Part I.A. 
21. Tese provinces include British Columbia and Nova Scotia, whose corporations acts remain 
modeled after older English legislation. Te Québec Business Corporations Act, which was 
revised in 2011, was inspired by the CBCA but includes many unique features. 
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a specifcally worded statute with a distinct legislative history—does not necessarily
control judicial interpretation of diferently worded provincial statutes. Second, 
as with many things in Canada, political attitudes towards private enterprise 
vary among the provinces, which may be refected in the judicial attitudes of 
federally appointed provincial judges.22 Other things being equal, it would not 
be surprising to fnd diferent attitudes between judges from Alberta and Québec, 
for example.23 Finally, given its bijural legal system, Canada has long been home 
to coexisting legal regimes, with federal law expressly recognizing difering legal 
rules across jurisdictions.24 
Unlike Daniels or Cumming and MacIntosh, all of whom emphasize 
statutory law, this article addresses judge-made law in the provincial superior 
and appellate courts. Te question of judge-made law is related to, though 
distinct from, the issue of legislative competition. As Daniels and Cumming and 
MacIntosh argue, legislative eforts to attract corporations can be undermined by 
a lack of judicial independence.25 At the same time, however, given the inherently 
evolutionary nature of the common law adjudicatory process, provinces may 
develop their own jurisprudence even in the absence of intentional competition.26
22. Although superior and appellate judges are federally appointed, provincial interests often play 
an important role in the selection process. At the very least, appointees are lawyers from the 
provinces in which they are appointed. Te judicial appointment process is set forth by the 
Ofce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Afairs. See Ofce of the Commissioner for 
Federal Judicial Afairs Canada, “Guide for Candidates” (19 October 2016), online: <www. 
fa-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html>. 
23. Regional diferences could potentially have signifcant implications for corporate law. 
Consider Québec’s long-standing tradition of corporate protectionism, for example, 
or Alberta’s high reliance on extractive industries. 
24. Canada’s ongoing commitment to reconciling the common law and civil law is evidenced 
by the federal Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21. See also David G Duf, “Canadian 
Bijuralism and the Concept of an Acquisition of Property in the Federal Income Tax Act” 
(2009) 54 McGill LJ 423 at 448-53; Aline Grenon, “Canadian Bijuralism at a Crossroad? 
Te Impact of Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act on Judicial Interpretation of Federal 
Legislation” (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall LJ 501 at 505-11; Alain Vauclair & Lyne Tassé, “Civil 
Law and Common Law Balanced on the Scales of Témis: Te Example of the Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency Act” (2003) 37 RJT 5 at 5-8. 
25. Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 9 at 154-58; Daniels, supra note 5 at 186-88. 
26. Competition does not require competitive intent. Much like natural selection, if corporations 
select provinces with advantageous case law, this process can be accurately described as 
“competitive,” even if provincial courts lack any competitive consciousness. For analogies 
between the common law and natural selection, see E Donald Elliott, “Te Evolutionary 
Tradition in Jurisprudence” (1985) 85 Colum L Rev 38; Herbert Hovenkamp, “Evolutionary 
Models in Jurisprudence” (1985) 64 Tex L Rev 645; Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis 
of Law, 1st ed (Little, Brown and Company, 1973); George L Priest, “Te Common Law 
Process and the Selection of Efcient Rules” (1977) 6 J Leg Stud 65; Paul H Rubin, “Why is 
the Common Law Efcient?” (1977) 6 J Leg Stud 51. 











Leaving aside the normative issue of whether such competition is desirable, the 
problem this article addresses is essentially empirical: Is there, in fact, meaningful 
variation in provincial corporate law? 
To answer this question, this article employs two methodological strategies. 
First, I present a quantitative analysis of judicial citations since Canadian 
Confederation. Measuring the frequency with which provincial courts of appeal 
cite decisions from their home provinces (as compared to decisions from other 
provinces) provides useful information regarding the scope of interprovincial 
infuence. Second, I present a qualitative analysis of three major corporate law 
decisions: Teck Corp. v. Millar,27 Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider 
Corp.,28 and BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders.29 Each of these cases and their 
citation histories illustrate the complex process of judicial standardization. 
My fndings based on these methods are: (1) as measured by case citations, 
provincial courts of appeal favour precedent from their home provinces, 
a phenomenon that has increased over time; (2) the Supreme Court of Canada 
exerts a powerful standardizing infuence across the provinces; and (3) on balance 
(and despite the “home province” bias of provincial courts of appeal), Canadian 
corporate law is largely homogeneous, with little provincial variation. Consistent 
with Cumming and MacIntosh, no single province exhibits a distinctive corporate 
jurisprudence.30 Tus, my primary conclusion is that while provincial courts of 
appeal apply nationally standardized legal rules, they do so by citing judicial 
decisions issued in their home provinces. In other words, even though provincial 
courts favour their own “domestic” precedent, their substantive jurisprudence is 
essentially uniform. 
Tis conclusion has important implications, both for Canadian corporate 
law and Canadian federalism more generally. Considerable variation in the 
economic, political, and social conditions of each province raise questions as 
to whether a distant, centralized appellate court without signifcant corporate 
expertise is the ideal institution for developing corporate legal rules. If provincial 
courts had greater latitude for doctrinal innovation, in what ways might corporate 
law evolve? Might the greater experience of provincial courts in adjudicating 
corporate law disputes result in clearer and more practical jurisprudence? 
27. (1972), 33 DLR (3d) 288 [Teck]. 
28. (1998), 42 OR (3d) 177 [Pente]. 
29. 2008 SCC 69 [BCE]. 
30. Te possible exception is Ontario, which is more infuential than the other provinces, though 
still subordinate to the Supreme Court of Canada. See Part II.B, below. 
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Is it possible that greater variation, rather than standardization, could better serve 
Canadian business?31 I return to these questions in the conclusion of this article. 
Following this introduction, the remainder of this article is organized in 
three parts. Part I presents a quantitative analysis of corporate judicial citations. 
Tis analysis reveals important trends in citation practices, including the growing 
tendency of courts of appeal to cite decisions from their home provinces. Part 
II assesses the citation histories of Teck, Pente, and BCE. In diferent ways, the 
legacies of each of these cases show the unifying infuence of the Supreme Court 
of Canada. Part III concludes by assessing the past, present, and potential future 
of provincial variation in corporate law. 
I. STATISTICAL TRENDS IN JUDICIAL CITATIONS 
One measure of legal diversity—or the absence thereof—is the extent to which 
provincial courts favour their own precedent. If provincial courts of appeal 
primarily cite “internal” precedent (i.e., citations to decisions within their home 
provinces), it may be evidence that provinces have developed their own case law. 
Alternatively, if each provincial court of appeal cites the same pool of leading cases, 
it may be evidence of jurisprudential uniformity across Canada. To determine 
which of these patterns characterizes Canadian corporate law, I analyzed a dataset 
of all corporate law decisions by all Canadian courts of appeal from 1867 to 
2017. Tese data shed light on current citation practices as well as how they have 
changed over time. 
A. CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
My dataset32 includes citation statistics for all reported corporate law decisions 
of all Canadian courts of appeal (including the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) from 1867 to 2017.33 “Corporate 
law” decisions were identifed using a custom WestlawNext Canada search that 
fltered nine subcategories within Westlaw’s “Business associations” Canadian 
Abridgment Digests classifcation, and which excluded decisions relating solely 
31. Supra note 27. 
32. Part II.A, below, is adapted from another article that uses diferent citation data from the 
same dataset. See Camden Hutchison, “Te Patriation of Canadian Corporate Law” (2020) 
70 UTLJ 107 at 113-15 [Hutchison, “Patriation”]. 
33. Many of the modern provincial courts of appeal were not established until after 1867. With 
respect to the years prior to the creation of a given province’s court of appeal, the dataset 
includes decisions on appeal issued by a panel or other appellate body of the provincial 
superior trial court. 









or primarily to adjacent felds of law such as bankruptcy, securities, et cetera. 
Tis initial search resulted in 2,328 reported cases. All reported cases that did 
not include any judicial citations in the majority reasons were excluded from 
analysis, leaving a total of 1,444 cases.34 Although this search procedure is not 
perfect—it necessarily excludes any cases not properly coded within Westlaw’s 
Canadian Abridgment Digests, for example—I am confdent that it captures the 
vast majority of reported corporate law decisions by Canadian courts of appeal 
between 1867 and 2017. 
After creating the dataset, a research assistant and I recorded the judicial 
citations in each decision, coding each citation on several variables including the 
identities of the citing and cited courts. For cases with multiple reasons, we only 
recorded citations contained within the majority judgment—citations within 
dissents and minority concurrences were excluded.35 Each cited case was counted 
once per decision, even if cited multiple times within a single judgment.36 
Finally, no distinction was made between positive and negative citations—all 
citations were recorded, regardless of whether the citing court was following or 
distinguishing the cited case.37 Once recorded, these data allowed analysis of the 
citation patterns of each provincial court of appeal, as well as the Supreme Court 
of Canada. More specifcally, the data permitted the testing of several hypotheses 
regarding interprovincial infuence, as discussed in Part I.B, below. A summary 
of these statistics for each jurisdiction (plus the Supreme Court of Canada) is 
included in the Appendix, see Part IV. 
34. Most cases in the dataset that do not include any judicial citations are very brief pro forma 
decisions with no citations to any sources. 
35. Tere are arguments for and against including citations within dissents and minority 
concurrences. Since my primary research question concerns the development of common 
law, I chose to systematically exclude judicial reasons without formal precedential authority. 
36. Again, there are arguments for and against counting citations once per decision, versus 
once per individual citation. I ultimately decided that recording each separate instance of 
the same citation within a single decision might distort the data by overweighting the legal 
infuence of certain cases based on arbitrary factors (such as the citation styles of diferent 
judges). In reality, it was relatively rare for a single case to be cited multiple times within 
the same decision. 
37. Te decision to count all citations equally was based on three considerations: (1) even 
negative citations indicate some degree of legal infuence; (2) as a practical matter, 
it is sometimes difcult to distinguish between positive and negative citations; and (3) true 
negative citations are relatively rare. 
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B. ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS COURTS’ RELATIVE INFLUENCE 
To assess various sources of infuence on the common law of corporations, I tested 
fve hypotheses using the citation data in the dataset. Tese hypotheses are: (1) 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada infuence provincial jurisprudence; 
(2a) Ontario decisions infuence the jurisprudence of other provinces; (2b) 
Ontario’s infuence has increased following the creation of the Commercial List; 
(3) British Columbia decisions infuence the jurisprudence of other provinces; 
and (4) provincial courts are more likely to cite precedent from their home 
provinces. Te reasons for these hypotheses—and the empirical validity of 
each—are discussed as follows. 
My frst hypothesis is that decisions of the Supreme Court infuence provincial 
jurisprudence. Tis hypothesis is suggested not only by the theoretical arguments 
of Cumming and MacIntosh,38 but also by the simple fact of the Court’s appellate 
authority. Unsurprisingly, the data indicate that the Court does have a signifcant 
infuence on provincial courts, at least as measured by judicial citations. For most 
provinces, the Court is the second-most cited source after “internal” citations.39 
For all provinces, the Court is at least the third-most cited source. Te percentage 
of Supreme Court citations by diferent provincial courts of appeal ranges from a 
high of 34.55 per cent in Newfoundland and Labrador to a low of 12.9 per cent 
in Québec.40 For all cases in the dataset (excluding Privy Council decisions), the 
average percentage of Court citations is 25.49 per cent. Te fact that more than 
one in four judicial citations refer to decisions of the Supreme Court shows the 
importance of the Court’s infuence. For its own part, the Court cites itself more 
than any other judicial source: 51.42 per cent of the Court’s citations are to itself. 
Moreover, the Court’s infuence appears to be growing, albeit gradually. 
While 25.49 per cent of all citations are to the Supreme Court of Canada, this 
fgure increases to 28.04 per cent when limiting analysis to years after 2008. 
As discussed in Part II, below, the 2008 BCE decision had a major impact on 
38. Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 9 at 154-58. 
39. Te Supreme Court of Canada is the most-cited source of the Court of Appeal of 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
40. Te fact that, among the provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador would cite the 
Supreme Court of Canada the most and Québec would cite it least, is itself unsurprising. 
Newfoundland and Labrador has very little internal precedent to cite, while Québec is the 
most independent province on several dimensions, including language, politics, and its 
unique bijural legal system. 
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
 2. HYPOTHESIS 2A: ONTARIO 
 
172 
corporate law, particularly in the areas of fduciary duty and oppression remedy 
jurisprudence. BCE and its predecessor, Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise,41 are 
frequently cited by nearly every provincial court of appeal, so it is not surprising 
to see a (slight) uptick in Court citations after 2008. Tis trend, together with 
BCE’s doctrinal infuence, suggest that the Court’s infuence may be growing. 
Of all the provinces, Ontario is the most likely to have the greatest infuence on 
corporate law. Not only is it the largest province by population, it also has the 
largest provincial economy, accounting for over 38 per cent of both population 
and gross domestic product (GDP).42 Given Ontario’s large volume of business 
litigation, the sophistication of the Ontario corporate bar, and Toronto’s status 
as the fnancial capital of Canada, there are many reasons Ontario would be an 
especially infuential jurisdiction. Although no Canadian province plays the same 
role as Delaware in the United States, Ontario is the most likely candidate for the 
leading jurisdiction in Canada.43 
As measured by citation statistics, Ontario plays a major role in corporate 
law across Canada. Tellingly, the province’s share of all citations is greater than 
its share of cases: Ontario accounts for 24.93 per cent of cases in the dataset, 
while citations to Ontario represent 31.47 per cent of all citations (surpassing 
the Supreme Court of Canada). If one excludes Supreme Court cases, Ontario’s 
share of provincial citations climbs to 38.73 per cent—almost exactly equal to its 
share of population and GDP. Te picture of Ontario’s infuence is complicated 
somewhat by the wide variation in citation rates across provinces. For example, 
while 63.74 per cent of total citations by the Court of Appeal for Ontario are 
41. 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples]. 
42. Provincial demographic and economic statistics are available through Statistics Canada. For 
demographic statistics, see “Population estimates on July 1st, by age and sex” (last visited 
November 2020), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000501>. 
For economic statistics, see “Gross domestic product, expenditure-based, provincial and 
territorial, annual” (last visited November 2020) online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/ 
tv.action?pid=3610022201>. 
43. In the United States context, Gregory Caldeira has shown that state appellate courts with 
greater “legal capital” (i.e., quantity of decisions rendered) exert greater infuence on other 
state courts. See Gregory A Caldeira, “Te Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of 
State Supreme Courts” (1985) 79 American Political Science Rev 178 at 183. Transposed 
to Canada, this theory would suggest that the Court of Appeal for Ontario should be more 
infuential than other provincial courts of appeal. 
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to Ontario decisions,44 this same fgure is only 11.23 per cent for the Court of 
Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador.45 Te high rate of citations by the Court 
of Appeal for Ontario is particularly signifcant—since Ontario accounts for 
nearly 25 per cent of all cases in the dataset, its court of appeal’s citation practices 
substantially afect the national average. If citations by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal are excluded from the analysis, the average percentage of Ontario citations 
is only 21.23 per cent. 
Ontario’s infuence is magnifed by the citation practices of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Te Court cites Ontario more than any other province: 24.01 
per cent of the Court’s citations are to Ontario decisions, making Ontario the 
Court’s second-most cited source after decisions of the Court itself. Tese citations 
are particularly consequential, in that the Court’s citation of individual cases 
often raises their infuence across Canada, a phenomenon discussed in Part II, 
below. Tis has occurred with several decisions that were not widely cited outside 
Ontario until after being cited by the Supreme Court. Trough this process, 
the Court has strengthened Ontario’s infuence in other Canadian jurisdictions. 
Moreover, Ontario’s infuence is not limited to corporate law. As previous 
scholars have shown, Ontario was historically the leading judicial province across 
all areas of law, the infuence of its court of appeal at times rivalling that of the 
Supreme Court itself.46 
 3. HYPOTHESIS 2B: THE COMMERCIAL LIST 
In explaining the success of Delaware, Daniels and Cumming and MacIntosh 
emphasize the state’s specialized judiciary. Unlike most courts, the Delaware Court 
of Chancery and the Supreme Court of Delaware have developed specialized 
corporate legal expertise, providing businesses with a predictable and efcient 
litigation forum. Indeed, the expertise and reliability of the Delaware judiciary is 
one of the state’s primary advantages in attracting and retaining corporations.47 
Writing in 1991, Daniels noted the absence of any similar forum in Canada.48 
Tat same year, the “Commercial List”—a roster of judges focusing exclusively on 
business and commercial litigation—was created in Ontario. Writing nine years 
44. After Ontario, Manitoba is the province that cites Ontario the most, at 35.99 per 
cent of citations. 
45. Prior to 2018, the appeal division of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador 
served as the Newfoundland and Labrador court of appeal. 
46. See Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (James 
Lorimer & Company, 1998) at 146. 
47. Romano, American Corporate Law, supra note 7 at 39-40. 
48. Daniels, supra note 5 at 170. 













later, Cumming and MacIntosh acknowledged the Commercial List’s existence, 
but characterized it as a “far cry” from the Delaware judiciary and questioned the 
commitment of any province to specialization in corporate law.49 
Given that two decades have passed since Cumming and MacIntosh’s 
assessment, it is worth reconsidering the Commercial List’s impact. Te central 
question for the purposes of this article is whether or not the creation of the 
Commercial List increased Ontario’s legal infuence. Based on citation statistics, 
the answer appears to be no. If the Commercial List increased Ontario’s infuence, 
one would expect to see an increase in Ontario citations after 1991. If anything, 
the opposite occurred. For all years prior to 1991, Ontario decisions represented 
36.22 per cent of citations in the dataset. For all years after 1991, this same fgure 
declined to only 29.18 per cent. Even within Ontario, less than a third of all 
corporate cases after 1991 have originated from the Commercial List, mitigating 
its infuence. Using the Commercial List is optional, and it is unclear why less 
than a third of litigants elect to use it.50 Whatever the reason, there is no evidence 
that the Commercial List has increased Ontario’s legal infuence. Hypothesis 2b 
can therefore be rejected. 
 4. HYPOTHESIS 3: BRITISH COLUMBIA 
In addition to Ontario, I also examined whether British Columbia infuences the 
law of other provinces. Why British Columbia? Tere are three primary reasons. 
First, British Columbia is (potentially) an attractive incorporation jurisdiction.51 
British Columbia’s Business Corporations Act,52 which does not follow the CBCA 
model, includes several features to attract businesses, such as an absence of 
director residency requirements,53 substantial fexibility in issuing shares,54 and a 
menu of alternative business entities, including “unlimited liability companies,” 
49. Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 9 at 157. 
50. Per the Consolidated Practice Direction Concerning the Commercial List, cases on the 
Commercial List must feature a material connection to the Toronto region, though this does 
not adequately explain its relatively infrequent use. See Ontario, Superior Court of Justice, 
Consolidated Practice Direction Concerning the Commercial List (SCJ: July 2014) at part V. 
51. Tis potential is perhaps unrealized. Tere are fewer incorporations in British Columbia than 
under the CBCA, and only 18.96 per cent more than Alberta (a province with 12.5 per cent 
less population). 
52. Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 [BCA]. 
53. Tis is in contrast with the CBCA, which requires at least 25 per cent of directors be resident 
Canadians. See CBCA, s 105(3). 
54. BCA, supra note 55, ss 52, 69. 
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“beneft companies,” and “community contribution companies.”55 Second, 
British Columbia would appear to exert an outsized efect on corporate law, 
with well-known decisions such as Teck, Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna 
Ltd.,56 and MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Binstead57 featuring prominently in case 
law nationwide. Finally (and perhaps most importantly), it is useful to compare 
Ontario citations against those of another province to fully understand Ontario’s 
infuence. In order to draw such a comparison, nearly any province would 
sufce, but I happen to teach in British Columbia and am most familiar with 
British Columbia law.58 
As measured by case citations, British Columbia is much less infuential than 
Ontario. Unsurprisingly, the appellate court that cites British Columbia the most 
is the British Columbia Court of Appeal, at a rate of 56.46 per cent. Te other 
provincial courts of appeal cite British Columbia far less often, at an average 
rate of 6.19 per cent. Similarly, only 4.19 per cent of the Court’s citations are to 
British Columbia decisions.59 Tis is somewhat surprising given the infuential 
role of decisions such as Teck in recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. 
Specifc British Columbia decisions such as Teck may not be representative, 
however. As discussed in Part II, the Court occasionally cites isolated decisions to 
support specifc doctrinal choices without following the broader case law of the 
cited jurisdiction. 
55. Unlimited liability companies, which combine the share structure of a corporation with 
the unlimited liability of a partnership, are often used by U.S. corporations investing in 
Canada to claim foreign tax credits and ofset U.S. tax. See Elie S Roth, “Welcome Back 
Stranger: A Canadian Perspective on the Taxation of Privately-Owned Business Entities and 
Owners” (2018) 24 Trusts & Trustees 120 at 121. Te BCA also ofers two hybrid social 
enterprise forms: the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia enacted legislation regarding 
“community contribution companies” in 2012 and more recently enacted legislation 
providing for the creation of “beneft companies.” Both of these entities combine aspects 
of for-proft and not-for-proft organizational forms. Both have also been the subject of 
academic critique. See e.g. Angela Lee, “Vague, Voluntary, and Void: A Critique of the British 
Columbia Community Contribution Company Hybrid Model” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 179; 
Carol Liao, “A Critical Canadian Perspective on the Beneft Corporation” (2017) 40 Seattle 
UL Rev 683. Te BCA does not provide for limited liability companies, however, a defciency 
it shares with all other Canadian corporations acts. 
56. (1976), 1 BCLR 36. 
57. (1983), CarswellBC (BC SC) 540. 
58. Tere are additional, more principled reasons for choosing British Columbia. Of the 
larger Canadian provinces, Québec is unrepresentative due to its legal and linguistic 
diferences from the rest of Canada, while Alberta’s reliance on extractive industries may be 
unrepresentative as well. 
59. Even adjusting for population, the Supreme Court cites Ontario roughly twice as often as 
British Columbia. 
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Internal citations—judicial citations by a court of appeal to decisions within 
its home province—are the most common category of citations. Seven out 
of ten provincial courts of appeal cite internal decisions more than any other 
source,60 often by a wide margin. In two courts of appeal—British Columbia 
and Ontario—more than 50 per cent of citations are internal, with Ontario 
featuring the highest percentage of 63.74 per cent. While not a provincial court, 
the Supreme Court of Canada displays a similar pattern of favouring its own 
precedent, citing itself 51.42 per cent of the time. 
Not only are internal citations the most common category of citations, their 
prevalence is increasing over time. Te following graph shows internal citations 
as a percentage of all Canadian citations over the entire time series, including the 
linear trendline.61 
FIGURE 1: MEAN PERCENTAGE OF INTERNAL CITATIONS, BY YEAR 
60. Te exceptions are the Manitoba Court of Appeal and the Prince Edward Island Court of 
Appeal, which cite Ontario decisions the most, and the appeal division of the Supreme Court 
of Newfoundland and Labrador (now the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador), 
which cites the Supreme Court the most. 
61. For each year, the total percentage of internal citations was calculated as the average 
percentage of internal citations for each case reported that year. In calculating these 
percentages, it was important to restrict the denominator to Canadian citations and to 
exclude citations to other countries, including England and the United States. Tese foreign 
citations account for most citations early in the time series, but only a small portion of 
citations in the later years of the time series. Including foreign citations in the denominator 
would therefore artifcially exaggerate the increase in internal citations. For an analysis of 
historical changes in national citation patterns, see Hutchison, “Patriation”, supra note 34. 
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Although there is signifcant variation early in the times series,62 the graph 
shows a clear trend of increasing internal citations over time. While several 
years early in the time series saw no internal citations at all, the average rate of 
internal citations has risen above 50 per cent in the last two decades. 
Does this mean that Canadian law is diversifying along provincial lines? Not 
necessarily. Independent of diversifcation, the increase of internal citations likely 
refects the growth of case law in each province.63 As the volume and variety of 
provincial cases has grown, it has become easier for provincial courts (as well 
as the counsel arguing before them) to identify internal citations rather than 
importing “external” case law from other jurisdictions. For this reason, there 
is nothing about internal citations that necessarily distinguishes provincial law, 
particularly if they express legal principles that already exist in other provinces. 
Moreover, in order to adopt an extra-provincial legal principle, a court need cite 
an extra-provincial decision only once—in subsequent cases, it can simply cite 
its own decision citing the original decision. Tus, although it is possible that 
internal citations refect diferentiation in provincial law, it is just as likely that 
internal citations actually express uniform rules. In other words, the jurisprudence 
of diferent provinces may reference diferent cases, while nevertheless converging 
on substantive legal standards. 
C. SUMMARY OF TRENDS IN JUDICIAL CITATIONS 
Te data provide contradictory evidence regarding diversity in corporate law. 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court of Canada is a major source of judicial 
citations across Canada, as is (to a lesser extent) Ontario. Tese citations likely 
have a standardizing efect across the provinces. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
cites Ontario more than any other province, and Ontario cites the Supreme 
Court more than any source except Ontario. Tese mutual citation patterns tend 
to reinforce the homogeneity of the law. On the other hand, however, the largest 
source of judicial citations for most courts of appeal is decisions from their home 
provinces, a phenomenon which is increasing over time. Tis pattern would 
suggest that each province is developing its own jurisprudence. Reconciling 
62. Tis is partly because there are fewer cases earlier in the times series. Given the law of large 
numbers (and a central tendency in results), a greater of number of cases should result in less 
variance. Te law of large numbers is a statistical principal which holds that a greater number 
of observations results in regression toward the mean. 
63. Tere was very little internal case law early in the time series, particularly for smaller 
provinces. In these early decades, provincial courts were much more likely to rely on 
English precedent. 









this evidence and clearly assessing the substantive diversity of corporate law—as 
opposed to merely nominal diversity in case citations—requires a closer, more 
qualitative look at how cases are actually cited. Tis is the question that will be 
addressed by Part II, below. 
II. CASE STUDIES OF JUDICIAL STANDARDIZATION 
By itself, the statistical evidence regarding pluralism versus convergence is 
inconclusive. Determining which of these patterns best characterizes Canadian 
corporate law requires additional contextual analysis. By examining, in qualitative 
terms, how specifc cases are cited, we can better understand the homogenizing 
pressures on the courts of the respective provinces. For this article, I examined the 
citation histories of three cases: Teck, Pente, and BCE. Each of these cases has had 
a signifcant infuence on Canadian corporate law.64 Teck, a 1972 Supreme Court 
of British Columbia decision, expanded the discretion of boards of directors to 
oppose hostile takeovers, and (in obiter dicta) suggested that directors’ fduciary 
duties are not limited to shareholders, but rather encompass a broader conception 
of the interests of the company as a whole. Teck has had a major infuence on 
Canadian takeover jurisprudence and was cited by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Peoples. Pente, a 1998 Court of Appeal for Ontario decision, drew from older 
cases such as Teck, but modernized and clarifed Canadian takeover law. In the 
years since it was decided, Pente has become a central case in the law of contested 
takeovers. Finally, BCE is among the most important corporate law decisions 
in Canada, as it standardized oppression jurisprudence across the provinces 
and infused it with a broad conception of the fduciary duty derived from Teck. 
Underscoring its infuence, key aspects of BCE have been codifed in CBCA 
section 122(1.1). Examining these cases and their subsequent citation histories 
illustrates the process of judicial standardization. 
A. TECK CORP V. MILLAR 
Teck involved a takeover contest between Teck Corporation (“Teck”) and 
Canadian Exploration Ltd. (“Canex”)65 for control of Afton Mines Ltd. (“Afton”), 
a publicly-traded junior mining company. Following unsuccessful takeover 
negotiations between Teck and Afton, Teck acquired a majority of Afton’s shares 
on the open market. To block Teck’s eforts to take control of the company, Afton 
64. Tey are also standard cases in corporate law syllabi (I teach all three). 
65. Canex was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Placer Development Ltd. 
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entered into an “ultimate deal”66 with Canex that granted Canex 30 per cent 
of Afton’s stock and development rights in Afton’s mining assets. In response, 
Teck sued Canex, Afton, and the Afton board of directors67 to prevent the 
ultimate deal with Canex. Citing established case law, Teck claimed the directors 
were actuated by an improper purpose in issuing shares to Canex. In response, 
the Afton directors argued that the Canex deal was in the best interests of the 
company. Departing from English precedent,68 Justice Berger ruled in favour of 
the defendants, holding that directors may issue company shares to frustrate a 
hostile takeover so long as they act in good faith and have reasonable grounds to 
believe the takeover would cause substantial damage to the company’s interests.69 
In obiter dicta, Justice Berger also stated that directors’ fduciary duties, although 
owed to the company, may encompass “interests lying beyond those of the 
company’s shareholders in the strict sense.”70 
Despite being a lower court trial decision, Teck has become one of the 
most infuential cases in Canadian corporate law. Until relatively recently, the 
number of takeover cases in Canada was small enough that Teck was regularly 
cited by provincial courts of appeal. For this reason, Cumming and MacIntosh 
highlight Teck as a “startling” example of nationwide reliance on a small number 
of corporate law decisions, which has resulted in a “national, and not a provincial, 
jurisprudence.”71 Subsequent to Cumming and MacIntosh’s assessment, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to cite Teck so as to broaden the scope of the 
fduciary duty has only heightened the decision’s infuence. As will be discussed,72 
the Court’s creative interpretation of the Teck decision highlights its infuence on 
corporate law. 
66. In the Canadian mining industry, an “ultimate deal” is a transaction whereby a major mining 
company purchases rights to develop the mining assets of a junior mining company. See 
Frank Iacobucci, “Te Exercise of Directors’ Powers: Te Battle of Afton Mines” (1973) 11 
Osgoode Hall LJ 353 at 355. 
67. Te named defendant, Chester Millar, was the president of Afton and a member of its 
board of directors. 
68. Although prior Canadian cases were not uniform on the issue, the traditional English rule 
was represented by Hogg v Cramphorn (1963), [1967] Ch 254, which the court explicitly 
declined to follow. 
69. In subsequent case law, this rule is sometimes referred to as the “improper purpose” test. 
I avoid that term, because it has been used to describe several similar but distinct tests in 
diferent cases. I prefer to describe the Teck test as the “reasonable grounds” test. See Teck, 
supra note 27 at 315. 
70. Ibid at 314. 
71. Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 9 at 155. See also MacIntosh, Holmes & Tompson, 
supra note 16 at 96. 
72. See nn 98-99 and accompanying text. 












As of this writing, Teck has been cited in ffty-fve Canadian cases: 
twenty-one in British Columbia; fourteen in Ontario; nine in Alberta; two each 
in Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Québec, and Saskatchewan; once 
in Manitoba; and twice by the Supreme Court.73 Te fact that Teck has been cited 
most often in British Columbia is consistent with Hypothesis 4, which posits 
that provincial courts favour decisions from their home province. Teck has had an 
infuence in other provinces as well, however, particularly Ontario. If anything, 
Teck’s two citations by the Supreme Court understate its jurisprudential infuence, 
as it was used by the Court to dramatically alter the traditional conception of 
fduciary duties.74 
Indeed, the manner in which Teck is cited is, in certain ways, more important 
than the number of times it has been cited. Signifcantly, most decisions that cite 
Teck, both within and outside British Columbia, make no mention of its province 
of origin, instead treating it as a general precedent universally applicable across 
Canada. In these citations, Teck is most often cited for its “reasonable grounds” 
standard regarding takeover defenses, and for the related principle that subjective 
good faith is relevant to the propriety of directors’ actions. In general, these 
citations are consistent with the pattern, described by Cumming and MacIntosh, 
of provincial courts heavily relying on a small pool of Canadian decisions. 
A few examples serve to illustrate. In the 1981 Ontario case of Re Royal 
Trustco Ltd,75 involving a failed takeover bid, Justice Eberle cited Teck as a “most 
helpful decision” and a “good example” of an area of law that, “while developing, 
is still in a somewhat unsettled state.”76 Although Justice Eberle stopped short of 
formally adopting Teck as precedent, in the following case of First City Financial 
Corp. v. Genstar Corp.,77 decided by the same Ontario court only a few weeks 
later, Justice Reid characterized Royal Trustco as a “reafrmation” of Teck, writing 
that “[t]he right and indeed the obligation of directors to take steps that they 
honestly and reasonably believe are in the interests of the company and its 
73. Teck has also been cited in Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong, as well as— 
surprisingly—seven times in the United Kingdom. See Tang Kam-Yip and Others v Yau 
Kung School and Others [1986] HKLR 448 (CA); HNA Irish Nominees Ltd v Kinghorn (No 
2) [2012] FCA 228; Latimer Holdings Ltd v Sea Holdings New Zealand Ltd [2003] 9 NZCLC 
263 [Latimer Holdings]. 
74. Peoples, supra note 43 at para 42. 
75. 1981 CarswellOnt 120 (H Ct J) [Royal Trustco]. Royal Trustco (and First City Financial Corp 
v Genstar Corp) were decided by the Ontario Supreme Court, the predecessor to the Superior 
Court of Justice. 
76. Ibid at para 14. 
77. (1981), 33 OR (2d) 631. 
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shareholders in a take-over contest or in respect of a take-over bid, is perfectly 
clear and unchallenged.”78 Similarly, the 1984 Manitoba decision of Olson 
v. Argus Industrial Supply Ltd.,79 which addressed the issuance of shares by a 
privately-held corporation in order to dilute a controlling shareholder, stated 
that “the law in Canada” on takeover contests was “was set out by Berger J. 
in the leading case of [Teck].”80 In relying on Teck, the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
provided no explanation, as a formal legal matter, as to why Teck was binding 
in Manitoba. Finally, in the matter of ASI Holdings Inc.,81 involving a contested 
rights ofering, the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador cited Teck on 
the twin issues of the relevance of directors’ subjective good faith in the context of 
a hostile takeover and the substantive standard for directors’ conduct in resisting 
a change of control.82 As in First City Financial Corp. v. Genstar Corp., Olson v. 
Argus Industrial Supply Ltd., and other similar cases, the court cited Teck without 
mentioning its British Columbia origins. In treating Teck as a general precedent 
of nationwide application, courts have fattened the distinction between the law 
of the diferent provinces.83 
Despite these cases, Teck did not become the universal standard in Canadian 
corporate law. Although Teck has been infuential, it has never been the fnal 
word on directors’ duties in takeover contests. A survey of the case law reveals that 
Teck’s “reasonable grounds” test has been signifcantly modifed—if not outright 
disregarded—by certain provincial courts of appeal. In the 1987 Nova Scotia case 
Exco Corp. v. Nova Scotia Savings & Loan Co., Justice Richard acknowledged Teck, 
but characterized the case law on defensive tactics as “somewhat inconclusive,” 
with “no clear line of authority.”84 On this basis, Justice Richard substantially 
78. Ibid at para 53. 
79. 9 DLR (4th) 451 (Man CA). 
80. Ibid at 454. 
81. Re ASI Holdings Inc, 1995 CarswellNfd 558 (Nfd SC) [ASI 1995]; Re ASI Holdings Inc, 
1996 CarswellNfd 115 (Nfd SC(TD)). 
82. In this case, the court found that the directors did not have reasonable grounds to believe 
the hostile shareholder would cause substantial damage to the interest of the company, and 
therefore ruled that the directors were motivated by an improper purpose. Re ASI Holdings 
(1995), supra note 82 at paras 20-21. 
83. To be clear, this phenomenon is not isolated to Teck. Canadian courts routinely cite 
extra-provincial cases without discussing their jurisdiction of origin. Occasionally, courts 
even cite extra-provincial statutes. For example, in the case of Bowater Canadian Limited 
v RL Crain Inc, the Ontario court of appeal cites the Alberta Business Corporations Act to 
establish the “applicable principle of corporate law” under the CBCA. (1987) 46 DLR (4th) 
161 (Ont CA) at 164. 
84. Exco Corp v Nova Scotia Savings & Loan Co, 1987 CarswellNS 44 (NS SC(TD)) at 
paras 343-44 [Exco]. 










narrowed the holding from Teck, stating that when a corporation issues shares, 
“directors must be able to show that the considerations upon which the decision 
to issue was based are consistent only with the best interests of the company 
and inconsistent with any other interests.”85 Justice Richard specifed, moreover, 
that “[t]his burden ought be on the directors once a treasury share issue has 
been challenged.”86 Tis decision departed from Teck by setting a stricter standard 
for target directors.87 What Exco shows is that notwithstanding certain cases’ 
prominence, provincial courts are capable of fashioning their own jurisprudence. 
Indeed, subsequent case law recognized a clear doctrinal split between the 
lenient approach of Teck and the more rigorous standard of Exco. Cases such as
347883 Alberta Ltd. v. Producers Pipelines Ltd.,88 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E 
Ballard Ltd.,89 and Pente recognized an important substantive distinction between 
Teck and Exco. In Producers, a 1991 Saskatchewan decision regarding the validity 
of a “poison pill,”90 the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan consulted Teck, Exco, 
and even the Delaware case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,91 ultimately 
ruling that in order to satisfy their fduciary obligations, directors must “show 
that their acts were reasonable in relation to the threat posed and were directed 
to the beneft of the corporation and its shareholders as a whole.”92 In terms of 
procedural requirements placed on boards of directors, Producers went further 
than Unocal, stating that “any defensive action should be put to the shareholders 
for prior approval where possible, or for subsequent ratifcation if not possible.”93 
Producers pointedly ignored the suggestion in Teck that directors’ fduciary 
duties are owed to the “corporation” as a whole, instead following the traditional 
principle that “the corporation cannot be considered as an entity separate from 
its shareholders.”94 Since 1991, Producers has been cited in seventeen Canadian 
cases, representing a stricter standard of directors’ duties in takeover contests. 
85. Ibid at para 341. 
86. Ibid. 
87. In the view of Richard J (explaining his departure from Teck), “the pronouncements in Teck 
go beyond what was required to decide that case” (ibid at 170-71). Exco also declined to 
follow Teck’s broad conception of the fduciary duty, instead equating “the interest of the 
company” with “the general body of shareholders.” Ibid at 175-76. 
88. (1991), 92 Sask R 81 [Producers]. 
89. (1991), 25 ACWS (3d) 853. 
90. A “poison pill” is a common term for a shareholder rights plan designed to deter 
hostile takeovers. 
91. 493 A.2d 946 (Del Sup Ct 1985) [Unocal]. 
92. Producers, supra note 89 at 402. 
93. Ibid. Unocal imposed no such requirement. 
94. Producers, supra note 89 at 18. 
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Tus, notwithstanding suggestions that Teck emerged as the “leading case,”95 
takeover doctrine actually developed along multiple, competing lines, with 
diferent Canadian courts selecting diferent legal standards.96 
Crucially, Teck did not achieve universal acceptance until after its citation 
by the Supreme Court of Canada, and then for reasons having little to do with 
the primary ruling of the original decision. In Peoples, the Court cited Teck not 
for its “reasonable grounds” standard, but rather for its obiter dicta regarding the 
fduciary duty, a discussion that ranged beyond the bounds of the central holding 
in the case. Despite the fact that Peoples was governed by section 122(1)(a) of 
the CBCA, and that Teck was decided under a superseded version of the British 
Columbia companies act, the Court relied heavily on Justice Berger’s obiter 
dicta,97 famously expanding his modest language regarding the best interests of 
the company98 into the following, much stronger statement: 
[w]e accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are 
acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, 
given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, 
inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, 
governments and the environment.99 
95. See e.g. Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 9 at 155. 
96. Even the British Columbia Court of Appeal has cited the Producers standard. See Hamelin v 
Seven Mile High Group Inc, 1994 CarswellBC 154 (BCCA). 
97. Te decision to use Teck to interpret the CBCA is all the more puzzling given the Court’s 
explicit pronouncement that it was interpreting the statutory fduciary duty under the 
CBCA, not the common law fduciary duty. In Peoples, the Court wrote, “[t]his appeal does 
not relate to the non-statutory duty directors owe to shareholders. It is concerned only with 
the statutory duties owed under the CBCA.” See Peoples, supra note 43 at para 42. Following 
this statement, the Court, citing Teck for authority, asserted that “[i]nsofar as the statutory 
fduciary duty is concerned, it is clear that the phrase the ‘best interests of the corporation’ 
should be read not simply as the ‘best interests of the shareholders’” (ibid). 
98. It is debatable whether Justice Berger’s obiter dicta encompasses non-shareholder interests at 
all. His discussion is framed as accepting, arguendo, that “[t]he company’s shareholders are 
the company…and therefore no interests outside those of the shareholders can legitimately 
be considered by the directors.” See Teck, supra note 27 at 313. He then alludes to 
circumstances in which considering the interests of employees and the broader community 
would be consistent with the interests of shareholders, concluding that the law should allow 
directors the fexibility to “observe a decent respect for other interests lying beyond those 
of the company’s shareholders in the strict sense” (ibid at 314). Although the passage is 
ambiguous, Justice Berger never authorizes directors to advance other stakeholder interests at 
the expense of shareholders, as implied by the language of the Court. Indeed, the decision in 
Teck hinges on the Supreme Court of British Columbia’s acceptance that the Canex deal was 
better for shareholders. 
99. Peoples, supra note 43 at para 42. 
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Te Court’s citation changed the way Teck is cited across Canada. Prior to Peoples, 
courts cited Teck primarily for its “reasonable grounds” test. Indeed, no court had 
ever cited Teck for its obiter dicta regarding the fduciary duty until the Court’s 
citation in Peoples.100 Following Peoples, however, nearly half of the decisions 
citing Teck have referred to its expansion of the fduciary duty (although far more 
cases simply cite Peoples directly). Although Teck was an important decision prior 
to Peoples, its current association with the nature of the fduciary duty is both 
recent and directly the result of its treatment by the Supreme Court. Why the 
Court chose to highlight Teck—a lower court decision from over thirty years 
prior—rather than more recent cases, such as Exco and Producers, is a mystery.101 
Whatever the Court’s rationale, its citation of Teck is a telling example of its 
signifcant infuence on corporate law. Prior to Peoples, Teck’s discussion of the 
fduciary duty had received relatively little attention, but it has since become one 
of the primary reasons that the case continues to be cited. 
Te Teck decision, its subsequent history, and its interpretation by the 
Supreme Court of Canada provide important insights into Canadian corporate 
law. One of the lessons is that Canadian courts pay scant attention to jurisdiction 
of origin when citing cases.102 Most decisions citing Teck never specify that it is a 
British Columbia case applying British Columbia law. Instead, courts treat Teck 
as a representative example of a national body of jurisprudence. At the same time, 
Teck also shows that Canadian law has not been substantively uniform, as Teck 
coexisted with competing lines of cases such as Exco and Producers. Finally, the 
history of Teck demonstrates the infuence of the Supreme Court, which infused 
the case with a novel interpretation. 
100. Most courts simply ignored that aspect of the decision. 
101. In their factum, counsel to the bankruptcy trustee for Peoples Department Stores Inc. argued 
that directors’ duties are owed to “the corporation” as a whole (rather than any specifc 
stakeholder group), but that the corporation’s creditors become the most relevant interest 
if the corporation approaches or enters insolvency. To support this argument, counsel cited 
several cases from non-Canadian jurisdictions as well as commentary in the Dickerson 
Report (a legislative report authored by the drafters of the CBCA), but not the obiter dicta
in Teck regarding the scope of directors’ fduciary duties. Appellant’s counsel cited Teck only 
for the proposition that directors’ fduciary duties are “objective” in nature and therefore 
not satisfed by good faith alone. See Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of ) v Wise, 2004 
SCC 68 (Factum of the Appellant). Since the arguments presented to the Court were limited 
to the rights of creditors, the Court’s view that fduciary duties may encompass “inter alia, 
the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment” would appear to be sui generis, even in light of Teck. Nor do the Court’s 
reasons present any coherent policy argument for expanding fduciary duties. See Peoples, 
supra note 43 at para 42. 
102. It would be interesting to know whether this is also true for other areas of law. 
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Decided in 1998, Pente involved a takeover contest for control of Schneider 
Corporation (“Schneider”), a publicly-traded Ontario food products company. 
At the time of the transaction, Schneider was controlled by the Schneider family 
through a dual-class share structure. Te litigation arose when Maple Leaf 
Foods, Inc. (“Maple Leaf”), one of Schneider’s competitors, made an unsolicited 
takeover ofer that was rejected by Schneider in favour of a competing ofer from 
Smithfeld Foods, Inc. (“Smithfeld”), a U.S. company. Despite Maple Leaf ’s 
willingness to increase its ofer, the Schneider family entered a lock-up agreement 
with Smithfeld, which the Schneider board facilitated by waiving a standstill 
agreement.103 In response, Maple Leaf and minority shareholders of Schneider 
sued under the oppression remedy to block the Smithfeld deal.104 
Although the Court of Appeal for Ontario ruled in favour of the Schneider 
board, its decision heightened the standard of directors’ duties relative to earlier 
cases (such as Teck) by reviewing both the procedural sufciency and substantive 
reasonableness of the Schneider board’s decision-making. Specifcally, the court 
emphasized the sanitizing efect of creating a special committee of independent 
directors to oversee the sale process.105 Following prior case law, the court also 
ruled that in order to bring a successful oppression remedy claim, plaintifs must 
demonstrate both the existence and violation of their “reasonable expectations” 
(which they had failed to do).106 Other aspects of the decision included an 
explicit rejection of Delaware’s “Revlon duties”107 and an implicit rejection of any 
duties owed by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders. Although it 
did not revolutionize corporate law, Pente represented an important clarifcation 
of takeover and oppression jurisprudence. Perhaps more importantly, for the 
103. See Pente, supra note 28. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Te Schneider board established a special committee consisting of the independent 
non-family directors to review the Maple Leaf ofer and consider other strategic alternatives. 
Ibid at para 3. 
106. Pente was hardly the originator of this standard. Many Canadian courts trace the inspiration 
for the “reasonable expectations” standard to a 1972 English case. See Ebrahimi v Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd, (1972), [1973] AC 360 (HL (Eng)). 
107. See Revlon, Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A.2d 173 (Del Sup Ct 1986) 
[Revlon]. Although the court was quite clear that “Revlon is not the law in Ontario”, its 
characterization of Revlon as requiring an auction process during the sale of a corporation 
was not entirely accurate. Although Revlon requires that boards maximize shareholder value 
during a sale transaction, nowhere does it state that a formal auction is the required means 
of doing so. Tis has been confrmed in subsequent Delaware cases. See e.g. Paramount 
Communications, Inc v QVC Network, Inc, 637 A.2d 34 (Del Sup Ct 1994). 














purposes of this article, Pente shows the power of the Supreme Court of Canada 
to “springboard” certain cases to national prominence. 
Given that Pente is one of many cases citing Teck, it is worth examining at 
the outset how Teck factors into Pente’s analysis. Like most cases, Pente cites Teck 
primarily for its “reasonable grounds” requirement, stating that “[i]f there are 
no reasonable grounds to support an assertion by the directors that they have 
acted in the best interests of the company, a court will be justifed in fnding that 
the directors acted for an improper purpose.”108 Unlike many cases, however, 
Pente directly addresses Teck’s extra-provincial origins by specifying that it was 
“adopted as the law in Ontario” in the earlier case of Olympia & York Enterprises 
Ltd. v. Hiram Walker Resources Ltd.109 Pente also cites Teck for the proposition that 
directors are not the agents of majority shareholders.110 Tis second citation is 
interspersed among several Ontario citations, creating the impression that Teck is 
on equal footing with Ontario precedent.111 Tus, although Pente acknowledges 
that Teck is an “external” case—and not without more binding authority in 
Ontario—it treats the decision as an integrated feature of Ontario jurisprudence. 
If Teck infuenced Pente, how has Pente infuenced subsequent cases? 
As measured by case citations, Pente is the more infuential of the two decisions. 
As of this writing, Pente has been cited in 105 Canadian cases, nearly twice as 
many as Teck in less than half the time period.112 More than half of the cases 
citing Pente (ffty-seven) have been Ontario decisions. Tellingly, Pente’s citations 
outside of Ontario increased following the Peoples decision, which cited Pente 
for the Canadian version of the “business judgment rule.”113 Prior to Peoples,
fully 80 per cent of citations to Pente were included within Ontario decisions. 
After Peoples, only 45.21 per cent of citations to Pente are in Ontario decisions, 
as provincial courts outside Ontario have cited Pente with greater frequency. 
Tis is almost certainly due to the Supreme Court of Canada, which bestowed 
signifcant institutional prestige on Pente in 2004. 
108. Pente, supra note 28 at para 33. Note, however, that Pente’s interpretation of Teck places the 
burden of persuasion on the directors. 
109. (1986), 59 OR (2d) 254. In this case, the Ontario Divisional Court “adopted” Teck based on 
two factors: the inherent persuasiveness of Justice Berger’s analysis and Teck’s prior citation by 
Ontario courts. 
110. Pente, supra note 2 at para 34. 
111. Ibid. 
112. Pente has also been cited once in New Zealand. See Latimer Holdings Ltd v Sea Holdings New 
Zealand Ltd [2003] 9 NZCLC 263. 
113. Peoples, supra note 43 at para 65. 
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Peoples has also infuenced why Pente is cited. Unlike most prior decisions, 
Peoples did not cite Pente for its approach to hostile takeovers,114 but rather for 
its articulation of the business judgment rule, a concept inspired by Delaware 
jurisprudence. In citing Pente, the Court directly quoted the following language: 
“Te court looks to see that the directors made a reasonable decision not a perfect
decision. Provided the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness, the court 
ought not to substitute its opinion for that of the board even though subsequent 
events may have cast doubt on the board’s determination.”115 
Although Pente has been cited for a wide variety of legal principles, most of its 
citations post-Peoples have focused on the business judgment rule. Prior to Peoples, 
seven out of thirty cases citing Pente (approximately 23.33 per cent) cited it for 
the business judgment rule. Beginning with Peoples, forty out of seventy-four 
cases (approximately 54.04 per cent) have cited it for the business judgment rule, 
a more than two-fold increase. Moreover, decisions citing Pente rarely discuss its 
provincial origins,116 but often specifcally mention its approval by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, suggesting that courts are directly infuenced by the Supreme 
Court’s citation choices. 
In this fashion, the Supreme Court has altered Pente’s place within Canadian 
law. Specifcally, the Court’s actions have (1) increased the frequency with which 
Pente is cited; (2) broadened the range of citing courts; and (3) focused attention 
on Pente’s discussion of the business judgment rule. Although Pente was an 
important decision even prior to Peoples, its infuence has been magnifed (and 
redirected) by the Court. 
C. RE BCE INC. 
Among the cases discussed in this article, BCE has had the greatest impact. It is, 
without question, one of the most important corporate law decisions in decades. 
BCE’s most salient feature is its afrmation of the principle, frst expressed 
in Peoples, that fduciary duties are owed to “the corporation” as a whole, not 
to shareholders per se.117 Equally important, BCE consolidated oppression 
jurisprudence by (1) establishing a two-pronged test for oppression remedy 
claims, (2) elaborating the factors that give rise to “reasonable expectations,” 
114. Ibid. Peoples was not a takeover case. 
115. Ibid at para 65 (quoting Pente) [emphasis in original]. 
116. Several decisions cite Pente in parallel with other cases from other provinces expressing similar 
legal principles. If anything, this heightens the impression that Canadian law is uniform. See 
Re Argo Protective Coatings Inc, 2006 NSSC 283. 
117. BCE strengthened this principle by applying it in the context of a corporate sale. 














and (3) providing preliminary explications of the terms “oppression,” “unfair 
prejudice,” and “unfair disregard.”118 Finally, and lamentably, the Court 
confated the fduciary duty under CBCA section 122(1)(a) with the oppression 
remedy under section 241, merging them into a single, overlapping standard of 
conduct and undermining the clarity of the Court’s oppression analysis.119 For 
better or for worse, each of these developments has had a major infuence on 
Canadian jurisprudence. 
As measured by judicial citations, BCE has been hugely infuential. 
As of this writing, BCE has been cited in 573 Canadian cases.120 In general, the 
distribution of citations per province mirrors their respective populations, with 
the exceptions of a disproportionately high number of British Columbia cases 
(132) and a relatively low number of cases in Québec (74). Although much of 
the scholarly analysis of BCE has focused on its expansion of the fduciary duty, 
the vast majority of judicial decisions that cite BCE focus on its two-pronged 
oppression remedy test. Following BCE, the Court’s requirement that plaintifs 
establish both a breach of the plaintif’s reasonable expectations and conduct 
by the defendant amounting to “oppression,” “unfair prejudice,” or “unfair 
disregard” has become the universal standard for assessing oppression remedy 
claims.121 After the oppression remedy, the second-most frequent reason for 
citing BCE is its discussion of the approval standard for plans of arrangement 
under CBCA section 192.122 In fact, very few cases cite BCE for its interpretation 
of the fduciary duty, which appears to be an issue that rarely appears in litigation. 
One of the most striking aspects of BCE’s citation history is the lack of 
attention paid in subsequent decisions to the fact that BCE was decided under 
the CBCA. Most cases in the dataset were decided under provincial statues, the 
interpretation of which is not, a priori, controlled by the CBCA. Nevertheless, 
few decisions citing BCE hesitate to apply it directly to provincial statutes. Most 
decisions treat BCE as if it were announcing uniform law. For example, in Carlson 
Family Trust v. MPL Communications Inc.,123 decided under the Alberta Business 
118. Supra note 29 at paras 62-68, 89-94. 
119. See Jefrey G MacIntosh, “BCE and the Peoples’ Corporate Law: Learning to Live on 
Quicksand” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 255 at 261 [MacIntosh, “BCE and Peoples”]. 
120. BCE has also been cited once in Australia. See HNA Irish Nominees Ltd v Kinghorn (No 2)
[2012] FCA 228. 
121. BCE, supra note 29 at para 56. BCE has been highly infuential despite the fact that its 
oppression discussion was arguably obiter dicta. See Puri et al, supra note 5 at 429. 
122. CBCA, supra note 4, s 192. 
123. 2009 ABQB 77 [Carlson]. 
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Corporations Act,124 the Court of Queen’s Bench recognized that “several cases 
provide summaries of the law in relation to the oppression remedy in Alberta,”125 
but then disregarded these cases by focusing on the “leading case” of BCE.126 
Given that the legal test for oppression under BCE is clearer and more precise 
than the standards articulated in previous Alberta cases, this decision to follow 
BCE was entirely reasonable, but it also represented a substantive change to the 
common law of Alberta, bringing it into closer convergence with other Canadian 
provinces.127 Similar developments have taken place in Ontario. In Palumbo v. 
Quercia,128 the Ontario Commercial List was asked to interpret the oppression 
remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA).129 In doing so, the 
court made the striking statement that “[t]he test for establishing oppression 
under s 248 of the OBCA has been clarifed and largely settled by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in [BCE].”130 Tis statement—which efectively equates the 
CBCA and the OBCA—strongly suggests that there is no distinction between 
the oppression remedy under the two statutes. In fairness, the CBCA and OBCA 
are very similar laws. However, even British Columbia, whose corporations act 
does not follow the CBCA model, has adopted the Court’s jurisprudence. To give 
but one example, in Jaguar Financial Corp. v. Alternative Earth Resources Inc.,131 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal cited BCE to interpret section 227 of the 
British Columbia Business Corporations Act,132 a provision similar, though by no 
means identical, to section 241 of the CBCA.133 Te court also cited extensively 
from the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s interpretation of the OBCA in Rea v. 
124. RSA 2000, c B-9. 
125. Te Court of Queen’s Bench cited two cases in particular. See Keho Holdings Ltd v Noble 
(1987), DLR (4d) 368 (Alta Can); First Edmonton Place Ltd v 31588 Alberta Ltd (1988), 
Carswell Alta 103. 
126. In addition to relying on BCE’s oppression remedy analysis, Carlson also followed BCE in 
construing directors’ fduciary duties as a general obligation “to act in the best interests of the 
corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.” Carlson, supra note 126 at para 78. 
127. As stated explicitly in the subsequent case of Murphy v Cahill, prior Alberta case law “has 
been overtaken, so far as the legal content of oppression is concerned, by the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision in [BCE].” 2013 ABQB 335 at para 77. 
128. 2018 ONSC 5034 [Palumbo]. 
129. RSO 1990, c B.16 [OBCA]. 
130. Palumbo, supra note 131 at para 79. 
131. 2016 BCCA 193. 
132. BCA, supra note 55, s 227. 
133. Most notably, although the CBCA protects “any security holder, creditor, director or 
ofcer,” the BCA only protects “shareholders.” CBCA, supra note 4, s 241; BCA, supra 
note 55, s 227(2). 







Wildeboer,134 strengthening the impression that oppression jurisprudence is 
uniform across Canada.135 Moreover, in cases such as Firebird Global Master Fund 
136 137II Ltd. v. Energem Resources Inc., Morgan v. Dadi,  and Herber v. Guse,138 
British Columbia courts have cited BCE’s broad conception of directors’ duties 
while deciding oppression claims.139 As these cases illustrate, case law across 
Canada has been signifcantly infuenced by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
particularly in the area of oppression jurisprudence. 
In one sense, BCE’s oppression test has been a positive development. Prior 
to BCE, oppression jurisprudence was vague and inconsistent, as it rested on a 
confusing mélange of Canadian and English cases without any clear unifying 
principle.140 Te two-pronged BCE test, by contrast, has the advantages of clarity, 
simplicity, and uniformity across the provinces. Te Supreme Court of Canada’s 
conception of “reasonable expectations” is appropriately contextual, and while 
BCE’s discussion of the terms “oppression,” “unfair prejudice,” and “unfair 
disregard” is hardly conclusive (as the Court itself acknowledges), these concepts 
may yet be clarifed by future lower court decisions.141 
Beyond the mechanism of the test itself, however, other aspects of the 
BCE decision leave much to be desired. Te expansion of fduciary duties to 
encompass “shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment”142 provides scant guidance to boards of directors as to how 
to appropriately weigh these interests,143 exacerbates the agency-cost problem 
134. 2015 ONCA 373 at para 186. 
135. Although most decisions ignore textual diferences between the CBCA and provincial 
statutes, some decisions do highlight discrepancies. See e.g. Runnalls v Regent Holdings Ltd, 
2010 BCSC 1106. 
136. 2011 BCSC 622. 
137. 2011 BCSC 1446. 
138. 2014 BCSC 1908. 
139. Although each of these decisions cite BCE at length, it is unclear whether they mean to 
introduce BCE’s broader conception of directors’ duties to the BCA. 
140. See Brian Chefns, “Te Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law: Te Canadian Experience” 
(1988) 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L 305 at 306-14. 
141. See Jassmine Girgis, “Te Oppression Remedy: Clarifying Part II of the BCE Test” (2018) 96 
Can Bar Rev 484 at 494-502. 
142. BCE, supra note 29 at para 40. 
143. See Sarah P Bradley, “BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders: Te New Fiduciary Duties of 
Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance and Good Corporate Citizenship?” Case Comment, 
(2009-2010) 41 Ottawa L Rev 325; Edward Iacobucci, “Indeterminacy and the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 232; 
MacIntosh, “BCE and Peoples”, supra note 122. Surprisingly, the Court leaves this balancing 
to the “business judgment of directors”. BCE, supra note 29 at para 40. 
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intrinsic to corporate governance,144 and encourages the inefcient use of 
corporate economic resources.145 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada 
leaves this balancing of interests to the “business judgment of directors,” which 
only heightens the inherent confict.146 Moreover, the Court confates the 
fduciary duty with the concept of “reasonable expectations” when it states (for 
example) “the reasonable expectation of stakeholders is simply that the directors 
act in the best interests of the corporation.”147 Tis confation of diferent 
concepts undermines the clarity of the BCE test itself and, if taken at face value, 
could severely limit shareholders’ ability to successfully bring oppression remedy 
claims.148 If, as the Court states, “reasonable expectations” are tied to the “best 
interests of the corporation,” and the balancing of competing interests is subject to 
the business judgment rule, it becomes difcult to imagine any situation (absent 
explicit self-dealing) in which a claimant’s “reasonable expectations” would 
144. In any corporate decision-making context, directors face the temptation of favoring their 
own personal or fnancial interests over those of shareholders. Te broader the range of 
“stakeholder” interests to which directors owe fduciary duties, the easier it becomes for 
directors to justify self-interested decisions. Tis danger was recognized in Unocal, Revlon, 
and even Teck as particularly acute during a potential change of control. Iaccobucci, supra
note 141 at 251-53. See also William T Allen, “Our Schizophrenic Conception of the 
Business Corporation” (1992) 41 Cardozo L Rev 261 at 275; Stephen M Bainbridge, 
“Director Primacy: Te Means and Ends of Corporate Governance” (2003) 97 Nw U L Rev 
547 at 581-82; Mark Van Der Weide, “Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders” 
(1996) 21 Del J Corp L 27 at 54-55, 69-70. 
145. Since shareholders are the corporation’s residual claimants, they have the strongest interest 
in maximizing frm value. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Te Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law (Harvard University Press, 1991) at 34-39; Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, “Te End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89 Geo LJ 439 at 443-44, 448, 
450-52; Andrew C Inkpen & Anant K Sundaram, “Te Corporate Objective Revisited” 
(2004) 15 Organization Science 350 at 353-56; Michael C Jensen, “Value Maximization, 
Stakeholder Teory, and the Corporate Objective Function” (2001) 12 Bus Ethics Q 235 at 
236; Duane Windsor, “Shareholder Wealth Maximization” in John R Boatright, ed, Finance 
Ethics: Critical Issues in Teory and Practice (John Wiley & Sons, 2010) 437 at 446-48; 
Michael E DeBow & Dwight R Lee, “Shareholders, Nonshareholders, and Corporate Law: 
Communitarianism and Resource Allocation” (1993) 18 Del J Corp L 393 at 415-22. 
146. BCE, supra note 29 at para 40. 
147. Ibid at para 66. 
148. Without explanation and without citing prior cases, the Court merges the fduciary duty 
under CBCA section 122(1)(a) and the oppression remedy under section 241, stating “this 
case does involve the fduciary duty of the directors to the corporation, and particularly 
the ‘fair treatment’ component of this duty, which, as will be seen, is fundamental to the 
reasonable expectations of stakeholders claiming an oppression remedy” (ibid at para 36). 




not be met.149 Te directors can always claim the “interests of the corporation” 
required protecting another interest group. Under this open standard, directors 
are granted full discretion to manage the corporation as they see ft, heightening 
the danger of unaccountable management. 
All things considered, oppression jurisprudence under BCE raises serious 
analytical problems. Te case has helpfully standardized oppression doctrine 
under a judicially administrable legal test, but it has also confused the oppression 
remedy with a signifcantly expanded fduciary duty, rendering both concepts 
less clear. Although BCE’s conception of the “interests of the corporation” 
as a broad collection of stakeholder interests might seem to promote corporate 
social responsibility, it is equally likely to weaken accountability to any specifc 
stakeholder group. Unfortunately, this conception is now entrenched in statutory 
law by Parliament’s adoption of CBCA section 122(1.1), which has efectively 
codifed BCE150—a rare example of legislation conforming to its judicial 
construction. Tis is all to say that, given the prominent role of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, BCE has left its mark on the Canadian corporate legal 
landscape, though not necessarily for the better. In a more decentralized judicial 
system, the case’s problematic aspects might have been contested in the respective 
provincial courts of appeal. 
149. According to the Court, “[i]n considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, 
directors may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, 
consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions. Courts should give 
appropriate deference to the business judgment of directors who take into account these 
ancillary interests, as refected by the business judgment rule” (ibid at para 40). Also, “[t]here 
is no principle that one set of interests—for example the interests of shareholders—should 
prevail over another set of interests. Everything depends on the particular situation faced by 
the directors and whether, having regard to that situation, they exercised business judgment 
in a responsible way” (ibid at para 84). Tus, directors cannot be held accountable to any 
particularistic interest. 
150. CBCA, supra note 4, s 122(1.1); BCE, supra note 29 at para 38. Te CBCA section 122(1.1) 
difers from the BCE in certain respects. First, s 122(1.1) specifcally includes “retirees 
and pensioners,” who were not mentioned in BCE. Second, “the long-term interests of 
the corporation” are an optional component of the fduciary duty under s 122(1.1), while 
language in BCE implies that directors must always consider “the long-term interests of 
the corporation,” at least when “the corporation is a going concern.” Finally—and most 
importantly—all of the interests under s 122(1.1) are interests that directors “may consider,” 
while BCE seems to imply that directors must consider stakeholder interests in certain 
circumstances. Tus, perhaps section 122(1.1) clarifes that advancing stakeholder interests 
is an optional, rather than mandatory, aspect of the fduciary duty. As of this writing, 
no provincial corporations acts have been amended to refect the CBCA, and no published 
cases have specifcally considered section 122(1.1). 
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D. THE INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
Teck, Pente, and BCE illustrate the important role of the Supreme Court in 
standardizing corporate law. Although Teck and Pente were infuential decisions 
in their own right, their legacies have added weight—and have been understood 
in particular ways—due to the citation practices of the Supreme Court. Teck’s
citation in Peoples signifcantly altered the legal principle for which the case is 
recognized. Prior to Peoples, Teck was cited primarily for its fexible standard 
regarding defensive tactics. Following Peoples, Teck has become associated with 
an expansive conception of the fduciary duty only alluded to in the original 
decision. Similarly, not only has the Supreme Court raised Pente’s infuence, 
particularly outside Ontario, it has also associated Pente with the business 
judgment rule. Finally, BCE is the clearest example of the Court’s infuence. BCE
standardized the oppression remedy across Canada, while clearly afrming the 
broad conception of the fduciary duty frst expressed in Teck. Although diferent 
courts in diferent provinces are capable of developing diferent doctrines, these 
three cases show the power of the Court to unify the law across Canada. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Tis article began with a simple question: Does the common law of corporations 
vary among the provinces? In light of the evidence presented, answering this 
question requires the reconciliation of two contradictory phenomena: the 
widespread, increasing prevalence of internal citations, and the unifying infuence 
of the Supreme Court of Canada. Tese phenomena appear contradictory in 
that a high prevalence of internal citations suggests diferentiation among the 
provinces, whereas close adherence to the doctrinal pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court suggests the opposite. 
On the one hand, the provinces have clearly developed their own case law. 
Provincial courts increasingly draw on internal precedent to address a wide 
range of legal issues. As discussed in Part II, most provincial courts of appeal 
cite decisions from their home province more than any other source, often 
considerably so. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Canada has clearly 
had a unifying efect on corporate law. Not only is it the second-most cited source 
in most provinces, but the areas of law on which it has most clearly spoken (e.g., 
the oppression remedy) are efectively standardized across Canada. 
How to reconcile this puzzle? One explanation is the growth of provincial 
case law. In past decades, it was difcult for provincial courts to cite relevant 
internal precedent due to the low volume of corporate litigation in Canada, 










particularly outside of Ontario and Québec. Citing cases from beyond a court’s 
province was often a practical necessity. Moreover, once an “external” case had 
been cited for a particular legal rule, subsequent courts could then cite the internal 
citing decision, rather than the external cited decision, thereby “domesticating” 
extra-provincial case law. Over time, the stock of internal decisions in each 
province has grown such that provincial courts have less need to cite decisions 
from other provinces.151 Tus, high rates of internal citations are compatible with 
doctrinal convergence, especially given the unifying role of the Supreme Court 
of Canada. As discussed in this article, landmark cases such as Peoples and BCE
demonstrate the Court’s standardizing infuence on the provinces. Trough its 
decisions, the Court has reinterpreted established precedent, altered traditional 
legal principles, and created its own novel jurisprudence; all of which has been 
passed down to lower provincial courts. Ultimately, Cumming and MacIntosh’s 
hypothesis regarding the Supreme Court’s institutional role is correct: the Court 
has limited diversity and encourages standardization. 
Does this mean provincial innovation is impossible? Not necessarily. 
As emphasized by Daniels, the Supreme Court of Canada’s involvement in 
corporate law has become increasingly infrequent over time. In decades past, 
the Court issued several corporate law decisions per year. Today, several years 
can pass without a single corporate law decision rendered by the Court.152 Te 
reasons for this reduction in corporate decisions are complex, but factors include 
the legislative repeal of certain appeals “as of right,”153 the “constitutionalization” 
of the Court’s docket following adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,154 
151. For a capital-investment analysis of legal precedent, see William M Landes & Richard A 
Posner, “Legal Precedent: A Teoretical and Empirical Analysis” (1976) 19 JL & Econ 249. 
152. Te Court issued no corporate law decisions at all in 2003, 2005-2007, and 2009-2013. 
153. See Donald R Songer, Susan W Johnson & Jennifer Barnes Bowie, “Do Bills of Rights 
Matter?: An Examination of Court Change, Judicial Ideology, and the Support Structure 
for Rights in Canada” (2013) 51 Osgoode Hall LJ 297 at 320, 323; Daniels, supra note 5 at 
187; Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: Te Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada (James 
Lorimer & Company, 2000) at 86; Donald R Songer, Te Transformation of the Supreme 
Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 44-45 
[Songer, Transformation]. 
154. CQLR c C-12; Daniels, supra note 5 at 187; Songer, Transformation, supra note 159 at 7-8. 
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and an apparent lack of interest on the part of individual justices.155 In the 
future, these and other factors could further reduce the Court’s involvement 
in corporate law. 
Were the Supreme Court of Canada to withdraw itself from corporate law 
entirely, allowing greater space for experimentation by individual provinces, the 
result could be the development of more economically responsive legal rules. 
Tis is particularly true given the Court’s limited subject matter expertise. Te 
Court is a pre-eminent authority on Canadian constitutional law, but is not, 
by any stretch of the imagination, a specialized commercial court. Today, the 
Court rarely deals with corporate matters—largely by choice—and few of its 
current justices possess meaningful corporate legal experience.156 Tis is in 
contrast with the trial and appellate courts of the larger provinces, which hear a 
greater volume and wider variety of business and commercial cases. As discussed 
in Part II above, the provinces of Ontario, Alberta, and Québec have established 
specialized judicial lists that hear commercial matters exclusively. Compared to 
the Supreme Court, provincial courts may be better suited to the development 
of corporate law due to their greater experience with business litigation, their 
closer connection to regional economic concerns, and—arguably—their greater 
detachment from national politics. Moreover, greater provincial autonomy and 
nationwide standardization are not mutually exclusive outcomes. If corporate 
law were allowed the fexibility to develop from the “bottom-up,” provincial 
courts would retain the freedom to emulate developments in other provinces.157 
155. Te vast majority of cases heard by the Supreme Court are on leave to appeal, meaning 
the Court has nearly complete discretionary control over its own docket, subject to a 
vague statutory requirement that cases accepted by the Court be of “public importance.” 
See Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 40(1). Under this standard, the Court’s 
docket has become dominated by constitutional, criminal, and other forms of public law, 
while private law cases have become a relatively small minority. Songer states that private 
economic disputes represent 27.3 per cent of the Court’s docket (while corporate/contract 
cases represent only 5.2 per cent). Songer, Transformation, supra note 151 at 53-67. Tese 
developments likely refect shared attitudes among individual justices as to which cases are 
of public importance. Te process of granting leave to appeal—which involves a written 
submission by the petitioner seeking appeal, the drafting of a memorandum by an individual 
law clerk, and a formal decision by a three-justice panel (with the possibility of discretionary 
involvement by any other justice)—is described above (ibid at 46–53). 
156. Although several of the Court’s current justices have commercial litigation experience, none 
is an academic or professional expert in corporate law per se. Te last recognized business law 
expert on the Court was Frank Iacobucci, who retired in 2004. 
157. Te democratic accountability of this process is assured by provincial legislatures’ ability to 
overrule court decisions through legislative amendments. Tis accountability is not clearly 
present in the context of Supreme Court decisions. 
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
 
196 
Over time, as provincial courts learned from the experiences of other provinces, 
an optimal set of legal rules might eventually emerge.158 For the foreseeable future, 
however, Canadian corporate law remains unifed under the Supreme Court, 
which is unlikely to be the optimal arrangement from an economic perspective. 
158. Te ability of the common law to produce practical, efcient legal rules for the governance 
of business relations has been recognized for over a century, extending at least as far back 
as 1912. See Rt Hon Sir Frederick Pollock, Te Genius of the Common Law (Columbia 
University Press, 1912) at 108-09; For a theoretical discussion, see Elliott, supra note 26; 
Hovenkamp, supra note 26; Posner, supra note 26; Priest, supra note 26; Rubin, supra note 
26. Although the Supreme Court is itself a common law court, capable of “learning” from 
provincial case law, its infrequent engagement with corporate law and its unique institutional 
role within the Canadian constitutional system leave it relatively removed from practical 
business concerns. 
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IV. APPENDIX: CITATION PERCENTAGES 
NOTE: Te tables below show the citation percentages (i.e., the percentage of 
citations to decisions of each province and the Supreme Court of Canada) for 
each provincial court of appeal, as well as the Supreme Court. Te largest source 
of citations for each court is highlighted in bold. Te category “other” includes 
citations to territorial courts, the Tax Court of Canada, and the Federal Court of 
Appeal. All percentages are rounded to two decimal points. 
COURT OF APPEAL OF ALBERTA 
Alberta 39.66% 
British Columbia 6.36% 
Manitoba 3.53% 
New Brunswick 1.19% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.41% 
Nova Scotia 1.88% 










BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEAL 
Alberta 3.08% 
British Columbia 56.46% 
Manitoba 0.73% 
New Brunswick 0.15% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.54% 
Nova Scotia 0.65% 
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MANITOBA COURT OF APPEAL 
Alberta 4.33% 
British Columbia 7.23% 
Manitoba 23.78% 
New Brunswick 0.92% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.54% 
Nova Scotia 1.59% 




Supreme Court of Canada 20.33% 
Other 0.93% 
COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK 
Alberta 7.80% 
British Columbia 6.76% 
Manitoba 0.93% 
New Brunswick 34.27% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.00% 
Nova Scotia 0.28% 










NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR COURT OF APPEAL 
Alberta 5.73% 
British Columbia 5.74% 
Manitoba 1.44% 
New Brunswick 0.00% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 33.78% 
Nova Scotia 3.24% 
Prince Edward Island 0.00% 










NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL 
Alberta 1.64% 
British Columbia 8.02% 
Manitoba 2.17% 
New Brunswick 0.49% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.55% 
Nova Scotia 42.46% 










COURT OF APPEAL OF QUEBEC 
Alberta 8.51% 
British Columbia 6.77% 
Manitoba 0.00% 
New Brunswick 0.00% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.00% 
Nova Scotia 1.17% 
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PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND COURT OF APPEAL 
Alberta 25.00% 
British Columbia 0.00% 
Manitoba 0.00% 
New Brunswick 0.00% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.00% 
Nova Scotia 0.00% 










COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO 
Alberta 2.53% 
British Columbia 3.36% 
Manitoba 0.70% 
New Brunswick 0.06% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.30% 
Nova Scotia 0.60% 










COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN 
Alberta 8.22% 
British Columbia 7.29% 
Manitoba 4.87% 
New Brunswick 0.27% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.00% 
Nova Scotia 0.88% 
Prince Edward Island 0.00% 








SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
Alberta 4.65% 
British Columbia 4.19% 
Manitoba 2.18% 
New Brunswick 0.11% 
Newfoundland and Labrador 2.40% 
Nova Scotia 1.20% 




upreme Court of Canada S 51.42% 
Other 2.53% 

